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Most of the work in evolutionary game theory starts with a model of a social situation that gives rise to a par-
ticular payoff matrix and analyses how behaviour evolves through natural selection. Here, we invert this
approach and ask, given a model of how individuals behave, how the payoff matrix will evolve through natural
selection. In particular, we ask whether a prisoner’s dilemma game is stable against invasions by mutant gen-
otypes that alter the payoffs. To answer this question, we develop a two-tiered framework with goal-oriented
dynamics at the behavioural time scale and a diploid population genetic model at the evolutionary time scale.
Our results are two-fold: first, we show that the prisoner’s dilemma is subject to invasions by mutants that
provide incentives for cooperation to their partners, and that the resulting game is a coordination game similar
to the hawk–dove game. Second, we find that for a large class of mutants and symmetric games, a stable gen-
etic polymorphism will exist in the locus determining the payoff matrix, resulting in a complex pattern of
behavioural diversity in the population. Our results highlight the importance of considering the evolution
of payoff matrices to understand the evolution of animal social systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is one of the fundamen-
tal tools to study how behaviour and traits of organisms
evolve by natural selection. An evolutionary game is
defined by different genetical strategies and their fitness
(i.e. reproductive output) when they interact with each
other. The genotypes increase or decrease in frequency
according to their fitness given the frequencies of
other strategies in the population. This process fre-
quently (but not always) leads to an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS), which is a strategy that, when fixed
in the population, cannot be invaded by alternative
strategies.
Earlier EGT models in biology tended to assume that
the genetical strategies correspond to actual behaviours
[1], or simple conditional rules that prescribe a certain
behaviour given the state of the individual and the inter-
action (e.g. the tit-for-tat strategy [2]). More recent
work has focused on interactions where individuals’ be-
haviour is not directly determined by their genes, but
instead reflect the outcome of a dynamical process
where the players respond to each other according to
proximate mechanisms that prescribe their behaviour
[3–7]. In particular, Roughgarden [8] calls for an expli-
citly two-tiered conception of behavioural evolution: the
first tier describes the dynamics of behaviour within
the time scale of an interaction where individuals can
adjust their actions in response to the context and the
behaviours of others. The second tier, on the other
hand, is defined by the usual evolutionary game, with
the distinction that the fitness values of the individuals
are determined by the result of the behavioural dynamics
in the first tier.
A two-tiered conception of behavioural evolution calls
for more explicit models of proximate mechanisms of
behaviour, instead of relying on implicit assumptions
and ad hoc interpretations of ESS outcomes. Further-
more, the introduction of behavioural dynamics opens
the door to new questions that have been overlooked pre-
viously, but have important evolutionary consequences.
The first such question is what the dynamics at the behav-
ioural tier look like. The two-tiered approach allows
dynamics where individuals may coordinate their actions
and act in concert with each other even if their fitness
interests are not aligned completely [6,9], and explicitly
model the evolution of other-regarding motivations [10].
In this paper, we are concerned with a second, comp-
lementary question; namely how the payoffs from the
social interaction themselves can evolve. To be more precise,
we make a clear distinction between the ‘behavioural game’,
which consists of the observable actions and material pay-
offs to the individuals, and the ‘evolutionary game’, which
is played between genetical strategies at the population
level. The same behavioural game can give rise to many
different evolutionary games, depending on how behaviour
is determined and whether individuals interact with each
other repeatedly, etc. Most work in EGT is concerned
with taking a given behavioural game and transforming it
into different evolutionary games by adding different rules
for decision-making. In contrast, we fix the decision-
making rule, and look instead at how the payoffs from the
behavioural game can evolve. To our knowledge, only one
previous study [11] has taken up this question before.
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We illustrate our argument with a simple example below; a
more general treatment is provided in the following sections.
(a) A motivating example
Consider two male birds that defend adjacent territories.
Each one can either fight (F) or make peace (MP) with
the other [12]. Fighting is costly in terms of time and
energy, and carries the risk of injury. Making peace
avoids these costs, but when a bird tries to make peace
unilaterally, it loses its territory to its fighting opponent.
This description of the possible behaviours and their
material consequences constitutes the behavioural game,
which in this instance has the familiar structure of the
prisoner’s dilemma:
male 2
make peace (MP) fight ðFÞ
MP 3; 3 0; 5
male 1
F 5; 0 1; 1:
ð1:1Þ
The payoffs to the first and second males are given by
the first and second number in each cell, respectively.
They stand for the material costs and benefits individuals
experience as the result of the social interaction—for
example, the territory area of an individual after the
interaction minus any effort spent on fighting.
When confronted with such a behavioural game, evol-
utionary game theorists have to make several decisions to
translate it into an evolutionary game and ask which beha-
viours will emerge from natural selection. The most basic
EGT assumptions are to take a very large population,
match every individual at random to play the behavioural
game only once and let the action of the individual be
determined by its genetic locus. Under these assumptions,
the evolutionary game looks exactly the same as the behav-
ioural game, and it is easy to see that the alleles for fighting
will increase in the population, as they have a higher fitness.
On the other hand, if the behavioural game is being
played repeatedly, there can be other types of alleles
that prescribe conditional behaviour, such as the
tit-for-tat strategy [2,12], where individuals behave
aggressively against fighting neighbours but not peaceful
ones (e.g. [13]). In this case, the strategies in the evol-
utionary game include different conditional strategies.
The fitness of each strategy will depend also on factors
such as how many rounds of the game are played, whether
the game is played against the same opponents, and so on.
Thus, one can construct many evolutionary games from a
single repeated behavioural game by adding new decision
rules as possible evolutionary strategies, so that even if the
behavioural game is a prisoner’s dilemma, the evolutionary
game rarely is.
Another way the evolutionary game can be trans-
formed is to not change the decision-making rule, but
alter the payoffs from the behavioural game itself. For
example, take a population playing game (1.1), where
initially all individuals fight, and suppose that one of the
males (say male 2) carries a mutation that reduces the
level of testosterone in circulation during territorial con-
tests. Suppose that due to this mutation, male 2 ‘pulls
his punches’ when fighting and displays reduced aggres-
siveness outside its territory. Label this modified
fighting strategy F*. As a consequence, the mutant
male 2 would leave a larger share of the territory to
male 1 even when the latter is not fighting. In this case,
the payoff matrix of the behavioural game between the
mutant male 2 and resident male 1 might look like this:
male 2
MP F*
MP 3; 3 1:5; 3:5
male 1
F 5; 0 1; 1:
ð1:2Þ
In the conventional EGT, the new strategy F* would
be added to the evolutionary game, leading to a sym-
metric 3  3 evolutionary game matrix, with the choice
between F, MP and F* determined genetically. In this
scenario, the residents who play F would not play differ-
ently against the F* mutant; hence the mutant would
not be favoured against the resident. In contrast, the
two-tiered approach allows male 1 to change its behaviour
depending on whether it encounters a mutant male 2 or a
resident one. In particular, suppose that male 1 is able to
recognize that his payoff is higher when making peace
than fighting and adjust its behaviour to take advantage
of this higher payoff. Then the outcome of the behaviour-
al game (1.2) would be the mutant male 2 playing F* and
male 1 playing MP, which yields a payoff 3.5 . 1 to the
mutant genotype. Hence, the mutant allele will be
favoured against the resident, and natural selection will
lead the population away from the prisoner’s dilemma
behavioural game we started with.
The simple example above illustrates how the two-tiered
conception of EGT opens up new ways to transform the
evolutionary game. These possibilities bring with them a
number of issues that need to be dealt with, such as how
much information individuals have, and whether and
how they can commit to various actions; we take up
these issues as we introduce the general model below and
also in §4. In the sections that follow, we introduce our
formal two-tiered framework with goal-oriented dynamics
at the behavioural tier and a population-genetic model at
the evolutionary tier. We then present an analysis that gen-
eralizes the intuition from the motivating example above.
In particular, we show under which conditions mutants
can successfully invade a prisoner’s dilemma game by pro-
viding incentives for their opponents to cooperate. The
resulting behavioural games are similar to the hawk–dove
game. Furthermore, a genetic polymorphism can be main-
tained in the population, leading to a diversity of games
and behavioural outcomes. We conclude with a discussion
of our assumptions and the implications of our results.
2. THE FRAMEWORK FOR PAYOFF MATRIX
EVOLUTION
Consider a social interaction between two individuals,
such as the territorial competition described above. Indi-
viduals in such an interaction might have different roles
(e.g. territory holder versus floater, or male versus
female). The role of the individual might be determined
genetically (e.g. male versus female) or environmentally
(e.g. territory holder versus floater). Likewise, the actions
available and the payoffs from those actions might be the
same (resulting in a symmetric game, as in the game
(1.1)) or different for the two roles. An allele that affects
the entries in the payoff matrix can find itself in either role
and in general might have different effects in each role.
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To describe the frequency dynamics of alleles that
affect the payoff matrix, we build a single-locus, diploid
population genetics model. We have two alleles, A and
B, and thus three genotypes: AA, AB and BB, which we
index with A, H (for heterozygote) and B, respectively.
We denote a game by Gij when genotype i is in role 1
and genotype j is in role 2. We assume that two individuals
are randomly matched to play a game, and afterwards
each is assigned a role in the interaction. We define rij
as the probability that genotype i plays role 1 when
paired with genotype j. By this definition, rij ¼ 12 rji,
and thus rii ¼ 0.5.1
(a) The behavioural outcome
We assume for simplicity that the payoff from the focal
game is the main determinant of an individual’s fitness.
The outcome of the game is determined by a behavioural
dynamics where individuals adjust how much time they
allocate among the two actions as a function of their pay-
offs. In particular, denote the fraction of time the role 1
player allocates to its action 1 by x1; similarly, denote by
x2 the fraction of time role 2 allocates to its action 1
(x1, x2[ [0,1]). We will assume that the players adjust
their allocations during behavioural time to maximize
their own payoff (termed ‘individual play’ in [6]).
Hence, the behavioural dynamic is given by
dx1
dt
¼ @u1
@x1
ð2:1Þ
and
dx2
dt
¼ @u2
@x2
; ð2:2Þ
where u1 and u2 are the payoffs to the role 1 and role 2
players; in a bimatrix game, the payoffs will be linear in
x1 and x2. We assume that the players will rapidly come
to an equilibrium point of the behavioural dynamics.
These dynamics are mathematically equivalent to a two-
population bimatrix game, and therefore any stable
equilibrium of the behavioural dynamics will correspond
to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game
[14,15]. We label the outcome of game Gij with Vij,
which is a vector with two components, representing the
payoff to each player. Thus, Vij,1 is the payoff to the
role 1 player, and Vij,2 is the payoff to role 2.
The behavioural dynamics allow individuals to discern
their actual payoffs and adopt new actions when confronted
with new games. The behavioural dynamic in our model is
essentially a repeated game with a very fast succession of
stage games, which allows individuals to adjust their actions.
Note that the key assumption is that players can discern
local (but not global) variation in their payoffs, and adjust
behaviour ‘myopically’. As emphasized in §1, this behav-
ioural plasticity is crucial to our model; in the absence of
it, mutants that provide incentives to their opponents
cannot ever benefit from doing that.
(b) The pairwise interaction model
We embed the behavioural dynamics in a diploid
population genetic model that operates over micro-evol-
utionary time scale. In the electronic supplementary
material, we provide the full recursion equations for the
population genetic model, which are equivalent to
the ‘pairwise interaction model’ (PIM) of frequency-
dependent selection [e.g. 16,17], with the interaction
coefficients aij between genotypes i and j defined as
aij ¼ ðrijVij;1 þ ð1  rijÞV ji;2Þ: ð2:3Þ
These interaction coefficients aij represent the
expected payoff of genotype i from a pairing with geno-
type j, weighted by the probabilities of assuming either
role. The recursion equations become:
wq0 ¼ fA½ fAaAA þ fHaAH þ fBaAB þ 1=2fH½ fAaHA
þ fHaHH þ fBaHB; ð2:4Þ
where w is the mean fitness, q0 the allele frequency in the
next generation and fi the Hardy–Weinberg frequency of
genotype i when allele A is at frequency q (i.e. fA ¼ q2,
fH ¼ 2q(1 2 q), fB ¼ (1 2 q)2). The PIM always converges
to an equilibrium and does not exhibit cyclic or chaotic
dynamics when the interaction coefficients aij are non-
negative [17], which is a reasonable assumption in our
framework.
This full recursion equation simplifies under special
circumstances, when q  0 and q  1, which give us the
invasion and fixation conditions, respectively. Allele A
can invade a population of BB homozygotes when
aHB. aBB. Conversely, allele A can go to fixation when
aAA. aHA. If no allele A satisfies the invasion condition,
then allele B can be said to be evolutionarily stable
(external stability sensu [18]).
Note that phenotypic ESS models are equivalent to a
haploid, one-locus genetic model, which would have
only two genotypes (A and B alleles). One can reduce
our diploid model to a haploid one by adopting the con-
vention of denoting one homozygote and the heterozygote
genotypes by the alleles A and B, and considering the 2 
2 evolutionary game matrix consisting of the interaction
coefficients that correspond to these genotypes. Note
that this modification of our model makes no difference
for the invasion conditions, which can be interpreted in
the context of standard evolutionary stability analysis.
3. STABILITY OF THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA
(a) The symmetric case
In this section, we apply our framework to a generic pris-
oner’s dilemma game, generalizing the example given
in §1. We assume that the role distribution is symmetric
(i.e. rij ¼ 0.5 for all genotypes i and j). In addition, we
assume the initially resident game is symmetric.
The game matrix between two homozygotes of the
resident allele B, GBB, is given by
GBB :
role 2
C D
C r; r s; t
role 1
D t; s p; p;
ð3:1Þ
where the actions C and D stand for ‘cooperate’ and
‘defect,’ and the following inequalities hold: t. r. p. s.
The outcome of the game with individual play is
VBB ¼ (p,p). Now, suppose a mutant allele A arises,
which invests into changing the payoffs from the game.
Specifically, assume that the mutant provides a ‘side-pay-
ment’ s. 0 to its partner that it can only receive when it
2200 E. Akc¸ay & J. Roughgarden The evolution of payoff matrices
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plays C when the mutant is playing D, and pays a cost
x(s). 0 for this side-payment. We assume that the
cost reflects a decrease in a component of the mutant’s
fitness that is unrelated to the social interaction in
question. For example, if the mutant allele reduces
testosterone levels in the blood during territorial contests
between two males, that might have a negative effect on
the success of the mutant male in attracting a mate. By
this assumption, the mutant pays the cost regardless of
the eventual outcome of the interaction. Hence, mutant
heterozygotes play the following games GHB and GBH
with the resident homozygotes:
GBH : C D
C r; r  xðsÞ sþ s; t  xðsÞ
D t; s xðsÞ p; p xðsÞ
GHB : C D
C r  xðsÞ; r s xðsÞ; t
D t  xðsÞ; sþ s p xðsÞ; p:
ð3:2Þ
(b) Invasion conditions
There are two possible cases: either s. p2 s or s, p2 s.
In the latter case, the NE is unchanged, and therefore such
a mutant can never invade, since it is paying a cost and
receiving no benefits. When s. p2 s, however,
the outcomes of these two games are shifted relative to
GBB, and become VBH ¼ (s þ s, t2 x (s)) and VHB ¼
(t2 x(s), s þ s). Thus, aHB¼ t2 x(s), and the invasion
condition aHB. aBB becomes
t  p . xðsÞ: ð3:3Þ
In other words, for the invasion of a mutant making a
side-payment, the side-payment has to be large enough
to shift the NE, and the cost of this side-payment should
be less than the benefit to be gained. With these criteria,
the stability of a game depends critically on the relationship
between the cost x(s) that the mutant pays to make a side-
payment of s. In the special case where the side-payment is
zero-sum in nature (i.e. when x(s) ¼ s), the invasion con-
ditions are reduced to t þ s. 2p. This means that
whenever the total payoff from the new NE induced by
the mutant allele is greater than the total payoff from the
NE of the resident game, the resident game can be invaded
by a mutant. On the other hand, if there is some ‘ineffi-
ciency’ in making side-payments (i.e. x(s). s), invasion
becomes more difficult, all else being equal. This situation
can occur when the side-payment consists of a resource
that increases one’s payoff in an accelerating manner: if
the individual with the greater resource makes the side-
payment, its loss will be greater than the recipients’ gain.
On the other hand, gains can also occur, with s. x(s),
if the benefit from the resource exhibits diminishing
returns to scale. This situation would facilitate the invasion
of the resident game by the mutant A allele.
If a mutant can invade the game, what then is the con-
sequence of an invasion (i.e. what does the game between
mutant individuals look like)? The game between
heterozygotes, GHH is given below:
GHH : C D
C r  xðsÞ; r  xðsÞ sþ s xðsÞ; t  xðsÞ
D t  xðsÞ; sþ s xðsÞ p xðsÞ; p xðsÞ:
This payoff matrix looks very different from the prisoner’s
dilemma: both off-diagonal cells are now NE, but each
player prefers a different one. This game is similar to
the hawk–dove game [19]. Besides the presence of two
alternative NE, the game GHH also features reduced con-
flict of interest between the players, as shown in figure 1,
which depicts the payoff polygons of the games GBB given
in equation (1.1) and GHH with s ¼ x(s) ¼ 1.5. The
payoff polygon is a plot of the different outcomes in the
game in the payoff-space and the convex set resulting
from linear combinations of these outcomes. The edges
of the polygon running from the upper left to lower
right-hand side denote the Pareto boundary: the set of
outcomes upon which it is not possible to improve both
players’ payoffs simultaneously, also called efficient out-
comes in economics. The length of this boundary can
be taken as a measure of the potential conflict of interest:
the longer the Pareto boundary, the greater the difference
between the preferred outcomes of the two players. The
invasion of the A allele shortens this boundary by
moving the outcomes (C,D) and (D,C) closer together.2
Furthermore, with the invasion of the mutant, the prefer-
ences of both individuals among the pairs (C,D) and
(D,D), and (D,C) and (D,D) become concordant in
game GHH. This is another sense in which the allele A
corresponds to reduced conflict between the players; see
§4 for more on this issue.
Incidentally, a coordination game such as GHH pre-
sents an additional question: which of the two NE will
the behavioural dynamics result in? This question is
beyond the scope of this paper and needs more detailed
modelling of the behavioural interactions, including
what initial actions individuals play. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume that each NE is equally likely to
be the outcome of behavioural dynamics. Thus, we
take the expected outcome of the game to be the average
of the two NE3, which is depicted by the larger circle on
the Pareto boundary in figure 1b.
(c) Stable polymorphism
We now ask whether the mutant allele can also sweep to
fixation. For simplicity, we assume that the effect of the
mutant allele on the game is linear in the number of
copies an individual carries (i.e. the mutant homozygote
makes a side-payment of 2s and incurs a cost of x(2s)).
(Our results are unchanged provided that the effect of
the allele is monotonic in its copy number.) To calculate
the interaction coefficient aHA, we need the games
between the heterozygote and mutant homozygote, GHA
and GAH, which become
GHA : C D
C rxðsÞ; rxð2sÞ sxðsÞþ2s; txð2sÞ
D txðsÞ; sþsxð2sÞ pxðsÞ;pxð2sÞ
GAH : C D
C rxð2sÞ; rxðsÞ sþxð2sÞ; txðsÞ
D txð2sÞ; sþsxð2sÞ pxð2sÞ;pxðsÞ:
ð3:4Þ
As in the game GHH, both off-diagonal cells are NE
in these games, such that the outcomes become
VHA ¼ 1=2ðsþ t þ 2s 2xðsÞ; sþ t þ s 2xð2sÞÞ and
VAH ¼ 1=2ðsþ t þ s 2xð2sÞ; sþ t þ 2s 2xðsÞÞ. The
The evolution of payoff matrices E. Akc¸ay & J. Roughgarden 2201
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interaction coefficient is thus aHA ¼ 1=2ðsþ tþ
2s 2xðsÞÞ. On the other hand, the game GAA is
GAA : C D
C r xð2sÞ; r xð2sÞ s xð2sÞþ 2s; t xð2sÞ
D t xð2sÞ; sþ 2s xð2sÞ p xð2sÞ;p xð2sÞ;
ð3:5Þ
which yields an interaction coefficient aAA ¼ 1=2ðsþ tþ
2s 2xð2sÞÞ. One can see that aHA .aAA whenever
x(2s). x (s) (i.e. when the cost is an increasing function
of the side-payment). Hence, mutants that can invade the
symmetric prisoner’s dilemma cannot also sweep to
fixation.
The intuition behind this result is the following: since
the homozygote games (GBB and GAA) are symmetric,
and the effect of the mutant is role independent, a
mutant that can shift the NE when in one role can auto-
matically shift it in the other role as well. Thus, a
heterozygote individual already is receiving all the benefits
from making a side-payment, in return for a cost of x(s)
only. The additional side-payment the homozygote makes
does not further alter the NE and only results in the indi-
vidual paying a higher, two-fold cost. Thus, heterozygotes
enjoy an advantage against both homozygotes, resulting
in a stable polymorphism.
What would such a polymorphic population look like?
Figure 2 illustrates the stable polymorphism for a numeri-
cal case, where the payoff matrix GBB is given by equation
(1.1), the mutant A allele is characterized by s ¼ x(s) ¼
1.5 and the polymorphic equilibrium is at q  0.39. In
this population, we would see all nine possible pairings
of genotypes, corresponding to nine different games,
and three different types of behavioural outcomes that
lead to 13 unique NE payoff pairs overall. Because the
genetic polymorphism is stable, the marginal fitnesses of
the A and B alleles must be equal to each other. However,
the same would not hold for the average fitness of individ-
uals playing D and C at the behavioural equilibrium (who
can be of various genotypes). For instance, in the example
depicted in figure 2, the average fitness of individuals that
play C at the behavioural equilibrium is approximately
1.01, whereas D-players’ average fitness is 2.62. Despite
this marked difference between the average fitness of the
two behaviours, both behaviours will persist in the
stable polymorphism, since they are not determined by
a simple genetic mechanism. However, a detailed genetic
study on this population would nonetheless find a genetic
component to which behaviour an individual converges
towards, along with indirect genetic effects [20].
This population would therefore constitute a
case where the alternative behavioural outcomes are
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Figure 1. The payoff polygons for (a) the game GBB (the resident prisoner’s dilemma behavioural game) and (b) the game GHH
(the game between the heterozygotes). Each corner of the polygons corresponds to a different cell in the payoff matrix, identified
by the combination of actions. The points in grey are non-equilibrium outcomes, they are not played as the result of individual play
dynamics. The outcomes in black are the result of individual play for each game. In (a), only the (D,D) outcome is the NE,
whereas in (b), both (D,C) and (C,D) are possible outcomes. The large black circle in each panel denotes the expected payoff
from the game to each role. In (b), this is the average of the two NE. In (a), the Pareto boundary is made up of the two line seg-
ments (D,C)–(C,C) and (C,C)–(C,D); in (b), the Pareto boundary is the line segment between the two NE. Thus, the expected
payoff from the game GHH lies on the Pareto boundary.
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Figure 2. The effect of genetic polymorphism in the payoff
matrices for the behavioural game. In this example, the resi-
dent behavioural game GBB is given by the payoff matrix
(1.1). Allele A is characterized by s ¼ x¼ 1.5; that is, it
transfers a total of 1.5 payoff units (per copy of A) from
the carrier of the allele to its social partner, when the
former plays D and the latter C. At the polymorphic equili-
brium of the population genetic model, there are three
genotypes and hence nine different games being played in
the population, which are represented by nine payoff poly-
gons in this figure. The NE for each polygon is marked
again with a large black circle. In total, there are 13 unique
NE payoff pairs because the games between genotypes with
at least one A allele have two NE (compare figures 1 and
3). The frequency of A alleles at the stable polymorphic
equilibrium is q  0.39.
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determined by both phenotypic plasticity and genetic
polymorphism [21].
How robust is this polymorphism result to the assump-
tion that the payoff matrix is determined by a single locus?
To answer this question, we conducted simulations with
multiple loci and recombination between those (see the
electronic supplementary material). Our results indicate
that with multiple loci polymorphisms are no longer
inevitable, but substantial potential for polymorphic equi-
libria exist, provided the number of loci is not too great.
Furthermore, the consequences for behavioural variation
in the population hold true whenever the genetic poly-
morphism is maintained, regardless of the number of
loci (see §4).
In the electronic supplementary material, we also dis-
cuss the cases of negative incentives and asymmetric
games. For negative incentives, we can derive results
that mirror the positive incentive case above. For asym-
metric games, we find that there is a range of mutants
that can both invade the population and proceed to fix-
ation, in contrast to the symmetric case above (see the
electronic supplementary material).
4. DISCUSSION
(a) Alignment of interests
We have presented a framework to model the evolution of
the payoff matrix in the behavioural game, and applied
this framework to study the evolution of payoff matrices
starting from a prisoner’s dilemma. Our first result
shows that the prisoner’s dilemma game can be invaded
by mutants that provide incentives for cooperation. The
evolutionary stability of a prisoners’-dilemma-type behav-
ioural game depends on the nature of these incentives
(e.g. how high a cost a mutant pays for a given change
in payoffs). When individuals in one role are able to pro-
vide an incentive at a relatively low cost to themselves, it
becomes easier for such mutants to invade, and for selec-
tion to align the interests of the two players. This result
raises the question of whether prisoner’s dilemma situ-
ations should be as ubiquitous as behavioural games in
nature as they are in the theoretical literature. In particu-
lar, the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm has attracted
criticism for ignoring the social context of interactions
[22], communicative mechanisms [23,24] and the pos-
sibility of direct benefits [25]. In one sense, our results
are concordant with these objections, as we show that
when animals are able to recognize their payoffs and
have the potential to react to incentives, natural selection
might lead away from the prisoner’s dilemma and sustain
a higher aggregate payoff through such incentives. On the
other hand, we also show that this is not necessarily the
case in all instances, and even when the population
evolves away from the prisoner’s dilemma by aligning
the interests of the players, this alignment is not complete
(see below).
The alignment of interests in our model occurs in two
different senses. One is a ‘local alignment’: in the NE of
the prisoner’s dilemma behavioural game, both players
play D, but each prefers the other to play C, while it
keeps playing D itself. The invasion of the mutant allele
shifts the NE (in game GHH) by reversing the preference
relations: at the new NE, one player plays D, the other C;
the two players now concur in preferring that the second
player plays C instead of D. Thus, we can say that the
interests of the players with regard to this move are
aligned (figure 3). The second sense in which the interests
are aligned can be seen in figure 1, where the difference
between the best outcomes from each player’s point of
view is reduced by the invasion of the mutant allele. We
call this ‘global alignment’, because it compares outcomes
where both players have to engage in different actions.
However, this alignment only occurs with positive incen-
tives, and not with negative ones. The local alignment of
interests is relevant for individual play (since coordinated
change in actions is not possible under these dynamics),
whereas global alignment is likely to be more relevant
for when individuals can negotiate the outcome [6].
Closely related to our first result is the model by
Worden & Levin [11], who also show that the population
will evolve away from a prisoner’s dilemma under such a
scenario, which concurs with our findings. One important
difference between the two models is that Worden and
Levin assume that changing the payoff matrix is costless,
which eventually leads to complete alignment of interests
between the players, whereas interests are only partially
aligned in our model.
The persistence of some payoff conflict between
players suggests that behavioural mechanisms might
evolve to resolve the remaining conflict, such as team-
play [6], other-regarding motivations [10,26] or positive
response rules [3,4,7,27]. Conversely, the evolution of
such a behavioural mechanism might mask the underlying
payoff conflict, and hence might contribute to the evol-
utionary maintenance of it. Other types of behavioural
decision rules, such as those aiming to maximize relative
(instead of absolute) payoff, might also hinder the
resolution of conflict at the payoff level.
Our model also relates to the theory of mechanism
design (e.g. [28,29]), which deals with incentive schemes
that induce self-regarding agents to reach desired out-
comes, such as maximizing their employer’s profits, or
revealing truthful information in a bargaining situation.
The local alignment of interests can be viewed as provid-
ing such an incentive scheme, especially since the average
outcome of the mutant game is efficient (i.e. lies on the
Pareto boundary; figure 1). The obvious difference
C,C C,D
D,C D,D
C,C C,D
D,C D,D
(a) (b)
Figure 3. The movement diagram of the two games GBB and
GHH. The arrows between each outcome (labelled by the
players’ actions) denotes whether each player prefers the out-
come to another or not (solid arrows, role 1 player; dashed
arrows, role 2 player). The NE for each game are marked
by a grey rectangle. In GBB (a), the leading and coming out
of the NE are in opposite directions for the two players, sig-
nifying that they are in local conflict at this equilibrium. In
GHH, on the other hand, the arrows leading from (D,D) out-
come to the two NE are in the same direction. For these
movements, the players’ interests are aligned. Note that
the players are still in conflict about the movement between
the NE and the (C,C) outcome.
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between our model and the mechanism design literature
is that we do not assume a designer that has the power
to change the game to produce results that fit its objec-
tives. Instead, evolution acts as a ‘blind mechanism
designer’, and the game emerges from the joint influences
of the two individuals’ genotypes.
A second difference is that mechanism design literature
primarily deals with a problem that we did not include in
our model, namely that individuals possess private infor-
mation, and might have incentives to misrepresent it.
The behavioural dynamics in our model rely on the indi-
viduals being able to observe and discern their actual
payoffs, which include any side-payments that their part-
ner’s genotype induces (see below). This ability allows
individuals to react optimally to new payoff structures
brought on by mutant alleles. Without such behavioural
plasticity, mutants that change the optimal course of
action for their partners would have no hope of succeed-
ing, since the only benefit such mutants enjoy results in
changes in partner behaviour that they induce.
(b) Polymorphism in games
Our second result is that in symmetric interactions, a
large class of alleles that affect the behavioural game will
result in a protected polymorphism. Alleles in this class
have monotonic effects on the phenotype (i.e. the behav-
ioural game’s payoff matrix) as a result of their copy
number (e.g. homozygote mutants making twice the
incentive payment and incurring twice the cost). If such
a mutant can invade a symmetric interaction, heterozy-
gote individuals will fare better against both homozygote
genotypes, and hence a polymorphism will result.
Taking the example given in the introduction of the
paper, such a situation would manifest itself as a genetic
polymorphism in genes regulating testosterone levels (or
their receptors) in territorial males, but males of all
types can be seen playing different actions, depending
on the pairing of partners.
This finding suggests that diversity in behavioural
games could be more common in nature then previously
recognized, and might account for much of the diversity
in behaviour that is observed. One potential example is
the curious breeding system of the penduline tits (Remiz
pendulinus) [30]. In this species, males build (with some
help by the female) an elaborate nest, and either the
male or the female, but not both, cares for the brood
while the other deserts. However, about 30 to 40 per
cent of all nests are deserted by both parents after the
eggs are laid, with the consequence of the investment in
nest-building and egg production being wasted. Since
biparental care is missing, this pattern of uniparental
care and mutual desertion cannot be explained by a
simple genetic polymorphism in the caring tendencies.
It can, however, be explained by a polymorphism in
payoff matrices similar to the one arising in our model
of the prisoner’s dilemma game. The ancestral game of
this clade is most probably more similar to the prisoner’s
dilemma, but with a negotiated behavioural outcome that
results in biparental care. If for some reason the popu-
lation evolves towards individual play, this would result
in deserting being the behavioural outcome. From this
point, a mutant such as that described in the symmetric
prisoner’s dilemma section can invade the population.
For the male’s side, for example, the side-payments
might be the effort spent by the male in producing a
larger nest, which has indeed been found to increase the
probability that the female cares for the brood, along
with the brood size [31]. For the female, the mechanism
of a possible side-payment might consist of laying larger
eggs that grow faster and require less care. Hence, our
model predicts that genetic polymorphisms for traits in
each sex that affect costs and benefits from caring for
the other sex will be present in the population and these
polymorphisms will explain the behaviour of the two
parents.
When the payoff matrix is determined with multiple
loci, polymorphisms are not inevitable, since with mul-
tiple loci it becomes more probable that the minimum
side-payment necessary to shift an NE will be a homo-
zygote genotype (see the electronic supplementary
material). Nonetheless, when the minimum side-payment
requires a different number of A alleles on the two
chromosomes, polymorphisms can be maintained with a
small number of loci, and all the behavioural conse-
quences of the genetic polymorphism continue to hold
true in such cases. Thus, the question of how common
polymorphisms in payoff structures are expected to be
depends in part on how many loci are involved. For quan-
titative traits such as antler size, this number is likely to be
high, so there is less potential for behavioural polymorph-
isms. On the other hand, regulatory genes that affect, for
example, the expression levels of hormone or neurotrans-
mitter receptors (e.g. [32]) or developmental pathways for
morphology (e.g. [33]) can have a large effect on the phe-
notype. In those cases, polymorphic equilibria are more
likely to be observed. Polymorphisms in the payoff
matrix can also be maintained by other mechanisms,
such as selection in heterogeneous environments (e.g.
one that results in different GBB matrices) coupled by
gene flow. Regardless of the evolutionary mechanism of
the maintenance of polymorphism, their effects on the
behavioural diversity in the population will be the same.
(c) Commitment and information
Finally, our model raises questions about how individuals
can commit to making side-payments that alter the be-
havioural game. In game theory, commitment problems
arise when one party has more strategic flexibility than
the other at some point in the interaction, and can use
this flexibility to take advantage of the less flexible party.
For instance, in the territorial interaction, a male might
‘promise’ a side-payment, but later withdraw this side-
payment during game play. While such cases are in
general possible (see below), there are two reasons why
they do not happen in the current model setup. First,
we assume the ‘side-payment’ to be a genetically deter-
mined trait, meaning that an individual cannot change
its side-payment during the time scale of the social inter-
action. The side-payments can only change over
evolutionary time through mutations and natural selec-
tion. This is a plausible assumption if the side-payment
is a consequence of a phenotype such as the sequence
of testosterone receptor gene; Obviously, the sequence
of DNA is fixed during the time scale of a behavioural
interaction, and hence the side-payment cannot be
withdrawn.
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On the other hand, even if the side-payments could be
withdrawn, it would not pay for individuals to do that in
our model. This is because we assumed that individuals
are able to discern their actual payoffs and react quickly
by adjusting their actions. Hence, even if a male with-
draws the side-payment, its opponent would recognize
this, and revert quickly to defection. Therefore, a side-
payer that does not honour its promise would not receive
the benefit of cooperation from its partner and would be
at a disadvantage. In other words, side-payments in our
model behave like simple contracts that are enforced
through credible threats of retaliation.
The assumption that individuals can always react to
each other and come quickly to an equilibrium is shared
with previous models of two-tiered dynamics (e.g.
[4,7,10]). This assumption simplifies the analysis greatly
and allows clean, analytical results. Nonetheless, it is
interesting to note what happens when equilibrium is
not assumed. Doebeli & Knowlton [3] numerically
evaluate the payoff to interacting partners during the tran-
sitory phase over a fixed number of rounds. Without any
spatial structure, they find that the response rules even-
tually evolve to providing no benefits to the partner.
Although Doebeli & Knowlton [3] do not address this
issue directly, this reflects the inability of individuals to
completely react to decreases in each other’s investments
due to the finite number of interaction rounds; hence
mutants that take advantage of the cooperative types
can invade. In the absence of effective retaliation, coop-
erative investments would unravel, similar to the way
defection can be shown to be the only subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in a finitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma [34]. Consistent with this conjecture, Doebeli
& Knowlton [3] find that increasing the number of
rounds increases the tendency for cooperative associations
to spread in a spatially explicit model.
The assumptions of accurate information about pay-
offs and very quick reactions are likely to be not
satisfied universally, but under some circumstances they
will be reasonable approximations. For example, a male
defending its territory is likely to be aware of how much
territory it holds, and also have an estimate about what
the expected breeding value of that territory is (our argu-
ment holds even if this estimate is imperfect). Then, we
only require that the same male will also be aware of
how much territory it loses during a territorial dispute
while fighting versus not, and adjust the time spent on
each action in order to maximize its expected payoffs.
In general, our model is applicable to situations where
individuals interact continuously in close proximity to
each other.
On the other hand, commitment problems will
become important when individuals have to make
spatially or temporally separated decisions. Gu¨th &
Kliemt [35] investigated how internal mechanisms for
commitment can evolve in a model of the ‘trust game’
where partners make sequential decisions. They show
that if enough information is available about who is trust-
worthy and who is not, cooperative commitments can
evolve because they provide incentives for their partners
to cooperate, similar to the outcome in our model. Both
types of mechanism are likely to play important and
complementary roles in social evolution. The interplay
between evolutionary dynamics of payoff structures and
behavioural mechanisms promises to be a fruitful
avenue to understand the diversity of social interactions
in nature.
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ENDNOTES
1An alternative specification would first specify the roles for the gen-
otypes and then match individuals of different roles to play the game.
That would lead to some changes in the equations, but the general
methodology would be similar.
2The difference between the best and worst efficient outcomes for
either player is t2 x(s)2 (s þ s2 x(s)) ¼ t2 s2 s, whereas in
the original game GBB it was t2 s.
3A mixed-strategy NE also exists, but it is unstable under individual
play dynamics; therefore it will not be the outcome of the behavioural
dynamics.
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